fix: resolve secret refs before sandbox draft probes (#8256)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the control plane operators use to manage agent
execution environments, including plugin-declared sandbox providers.
> - The failing user path here was `Test draft` for an unsaved sandbox
environment using a schema field marked `format: "secret-ref"`.
> - Saved environments already resolve secret refs before provider use,
but the unsaved probe path was forwarding the selected secret UUID
directly to the provider, which made Novita draft probes fail.
> - Fixing that safely required a probe-only secret resolution path with
explicit actor authorization and audit context, because an unsaved draft
has no persisted environment binding to authorize against.
> - Once that was fixed, CI and review surfaced follow-up hardening
work: preserve actor source through the draft-probe path, prevent late
heartbeat finalization from overwriting already-terminal runs, avoid
duplicate successful-run handoff wakes for comment-driven runs, make SSH
git ref updates tolerate concurrent managed-runtime restores, and keep
the skills catalog build from failing on transient GitHub errors for
pinned references.
> - The result is that Novita draft probes now behave like saved
environments, the new secret access path is constrained and audited, and
the PR is green end-to-end with Greptile at 5/5.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No matching public GitHub issue was found after searching open and
closed Paperclip issues for `novita`. Related PR search found
[#8255](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/8255), but it
addresses Novita/dev-SDK linking rather than this draft probe bug.

Bug summary:
- What happened?
When a board user configured a sandbox environment backed by a
schema-driven plugin provider such as Novita, selecting an existing
company secret for `apiKey` and clicking `Test draft` failed because the
probe received the secret UUID instead of the resolved secret value.
- Expected behavior
`Test draft` should resolve secret-ref fields before calling the
provider probe, just like the saved runtime path does.
- Steps to reproduce
  1. Open `Company Settings -> Environments`.
2. Create or edit a `Sandbox` environment using a provider with a
`format: "secret-ref"` field such as `Novita Agent Sandbox`.
  3. Select an existing company secret for `apiKey`.
  4. Click `Test draft`.
  5. Observe the probe failure before this patch.
- Paperclip version or commit
Reproduced on a local `master` dev checkout; fixed and verified on
branch commit `ed982d0c0`.
- Deployment mode
  Local dev (`pnpm dev`).
- Installation method
  Built from source (`pnpm dev` / `pnpm build`).
- Agent adapter(s) involved
Not adapter-specific in the core bug path; affects schema-driven sandbox
provider plugins such as Novita.
- Database mode
  Not database-related.
- Access context
  Board (human operator).
- Node.js version
  `v25.6.1`.
- Operating system
  `macOS 15.7.4`.
- Relevant logs or output
The user-visible failure was `Novita sandbox probe failed` during `Test
draft`.

## What Changed

- Resolved schema-marked secret-ref fields during unsaved sandbox
environment probes by adding a dedicated probe-time secret resolution
path in `environment-config.ts`.
- Passed `companyId` plus the full authenticated actor context into the
draft probe normalization route so secret resolution stays
company-scoped, authorized, and auditable.
- Hardened ephemeral secret resolution so unsaved probes require
`secrets:read`, preserve the original actor source (`local_implicit`,
`agent_jwt`, etc.), and emit usable audit metadata.
- Added a conditional heartbeat run-status update so late adapter
completions cannot overwrite runs that were already cancelled or
otherwise terminal.
- Skipped successful-run handoff synthesis for comment-driven wakes,
which removes the extra wake/run that was breaking
`heartbeat-comment-wake-batching`.
- Retried managed-runtime SSH git ref updates on concurrent ref-lock
races instead of failing the restore path.
- Reused the previous skills-catalog manifest entry when a pinned GitHub
reference fails with a recoverable transient error during CI catalog
generation.
- Added focused regression coverage for the draft probe, ephemeral
secret access, heartbeat handoff behavior, SSH ref-lock races, and
catalog fallback behavior.

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run
server/src/services/recovery/successful-run-handoff.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run
server/src/__tests__/openclaw-gateway-adapter.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/ssh-fixture.test.ts
-t "merges concurrent remote commits through the managed runtime restore
path"`
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/skills-catalog/src/catalog-builder.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/skills-catalog build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils build`
- `gh pr checks 8256`
- Manual/live validation: the same fix was cherry-picked into the
running local dev checkout and the user re-tested the Novita `Test
draft` flow successfully after the server restart.

## Risks

- Low risk: the Novita-specific user-facing fix is isolated to unsaved
sandbox draft probes for plugin schema fields marked `format:
"secret-ref"`.
- The new ephemeral secret resolution path is intentionally stricter
than the original broken behavior; regressions would most likely show up
as denied draft probes rather than accidental secret exposure.
- The heartbeat, SSH, and catalog changes are all defensive; if they
regress, they should affect test/CI orchestration paths rather than
persisted company data.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex Local (`codex_local` in Paperclip). The runtime does not
expose the exact backend model ID in agent metadata. GPT-5-class coding
model with shell/tool use, repository editing, test execution, GitHub
review handling, and issue-thread coordination.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
Devin Foley
2026-06-18 07:48:09 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 93291df5c8
commit 04173b341d
12 changed files with 833 additions and 82 deletions
+81 -9
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ import {
secretProviderConfigDiscoveryPreviewSchema,
updateSecretProviderConfigSchema,
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
import { conflict, HttpError, notFound, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
import { conflict, forbidden, HttpError, notFound, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
import {
checkSecretProviders,
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ import type {
SecretProviderWriteContext,
} from "../secrets/types.js";
import { isSecretProviderClientError } from "../secrets/types.js";
import { authorizationService } from "./authorization.js";
const ENV_KEY_RE = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/;
const SENSITIVE_ENV_KEY_RE =
@@ -178,12 +179,18 @@ type SecretConsumerContext = {
configPath?: string | null;
actorType?: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
actorId?: string | null;
actorSource?: "local_implicit" | "session" | "board_key" | "agent_key" | "agent_jwt" | "cloud_tenant";
issueId?: string | null;
heartbeatRunId?: string | null;
pluginId?: string | null;
allowedBindingIds?: string[] | null;
};
type SecretResolutionOptions = {
bindingContext?: SecretConsumerContext;
accessContext?: SecretConsumerContext;
};
export type RuntimeSecretManifestEntry = {
configPath: string;
envKey: string | null;
@@ -295,6 +302,8 @@ function assertSelectableProviderConfig(config: {
}
export function secretService(db: Db) {
const authorization = authorizationService(db);
type NormalizeEnvOptions = {
strictMode?: boolean;
fieldPath?: string;
@@ -562,14 +571,16 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
companyId: string,
secretId: string,
version: number | "latest",
context?: SecretConsumerContext,
options?: SecretResolutionOptions,
): Promise<RuntimeSecretResolution> {
const bindingContext = options?.bindingContext;
const accessContext = options?.accessContext ?? bindingContext;
const secret = await getById(secretId);
if (!secret) throw notFound("Secret not found");
if (secret.companyId !== companyId) throw unprocessable("Secret must belong to same company");
const resolvedVersion = version === "latest" ? secret.latestVersion : version;
const providerId = secret.provider as SecretProvider;
const configPath = context?.configPath ?? null;
const configPath = accessContext?.configPath ?? null;
try {
if (secret.status === "deleted") {
throw new HttpError(404, "Secret not found", { code: "secret_deleted" });
@@ -577,7 +588,7 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
if (secret.status !== "active") {
throw unprocessable("Secret is not active", { code: "secret_inactive" });
}
const binding = await assertBindingContext(companyId, secret.id, context);
const binding = await assertBindingContext(companyId, secret.id, bindingContext);
const versionRow = await getSecretVersion(secret.id, resolvedVersion);
if (!versionRow) throw new HttpError(404, "Secret version not found", { code: "version_missing" });
if (versionRow.status === "disabled" || versionRow.status === "destroyed" || versionRow.revokedAt) {
@@ -612,7 +623,7 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
secretId: secret.id,
version: resolvedVersion,
provider: providerId,
context,
context: accessContext,
outcome: "success",
}).catch(() => undefined),
]);
@@ -636,7 +647,7 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
secretId: secret.id,
version: resolvedVersion,
provider: providerId,
context,
context: accessContext,
outcome: "failure",
errorCode,
}).catch(() => undefined);
@@ -650,7 +661,57 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
version: number | "latest",
context?: SecretConsumerContext,
): Promise<string> {
return (await resolveSecretValueInternal(companyId, secretId, version, context)).value;
return (await resolveSecretValueInternal(companyId, secretId, version, {
bindingContext: context,
accessContext: context,
})).value;
}
async function resolveSecretValueForEphemeralAccess(
companyId: string,
secretId: string,
version: number | "latest",
context: SecretConsumerContext,
): Promise<string> {
if (context.consumerType !== "system" || context.consumerId !== "environment-probe-config") {
throw forbidden("Ephemeral secret resolution is limited to draft environment probes");
}
if (
(context.actorType !== "agent" && context.actorType !== "user") ||
!context.actorId?.trim()
) {
throw forbidden("Ephemeral secret resolution requires an authenticated actor");
}
const actor =
context.actorType === "agent"
? {
type: "agent" as const,
agentId: context.actorId,
companyId,
source: context.actorSource === "agent_jwt" ? "agent_jwt" as const : "agent_key" as const,
}
: {
type: "board" as const,
userId: context.actorId,
source: context.actorSource === "local_implicit"
? "local_implicit" as const
: context.actorSource === "board_key"
? "board_key" as const
: context.actorSource === "cloud_tenant"
? "cloud_tenant" as const
: "session" as const,
};
const decision = await authorization.decide({
actor,
action: "secrets:read",
resource: { type: "company", companyId },
});
if (!decision.allowed) {
throw forbidden(decision.explanation);
}
return (await resolveSecretValueInternal(companyId, secretId, version, {
accessContext: context,
})).value;
}
async function normalizeEnvConfig(
@@ -1579,6 +1640,7 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
getById,
getByName,
resolveSecretValue,
resolveSecretValueForEphemeralAccess,
create: async (
companyId: string,
@@ -2275,7 +2337,12 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
companyId,
binding.secretId,
binding.version,
context ? { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` } : undefined,
context
? {
bindingContext: { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` },
accessContext: { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` },
}
: undefined,
);
resolved[key] = secretResolution.value;
manifest.push(secretResolution.manifestEntry);
@@ -2318,7 +2385,12 @@ export function secretService(db: Db) {
companyId,
binding.secretId,
binding.version,
context ? { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` } : undefined,
context
? {
bindingContext: { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` },
accessContext: { ...context, configPath: `env.${key}` },
}
: undefined,
);
env[key] = secretResolution.value;
manifest.push(secretResolution.manifestEntry);