[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control plane. > - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the boundary between autonomy and governance. > - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries. > - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls. > - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public core/plugin infrastructure work. > - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental `plugin-briefs` package. > - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved Greptile threads. > - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal operators. ## What Changed - Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service. - Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots, authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge invocation scope propagation. - Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind plugin-provided settings surfaces. - Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices. - Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback behavior. - Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active agent memberships and role-default human permission grants. - Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch changes. - Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff. - Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and startup test mocks. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 28 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed. - `git diff --check` -> passed. - `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed. - `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed with no lockfile update. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed. - `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0. - GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`. - Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0 comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads. - Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`, `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or `.github/workflows` changes. ## Risks - Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are configured. - Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company scoping. - Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill, but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell, git, and GitHub CLI access. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -501,6 +501,15 @@ export function agentRoutes(
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};
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}
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if (membership?.status === "active") {
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return {
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canAssignTasks: true,
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taskAssignSource: "simple_default" as const,
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membership,
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grants,
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};
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}
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return {
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canAssignTasks: false,
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taskAssignSource: "none" as const,
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@@ -543,34 +552,32 @@ export function agentRoutes(
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async function assertCanCreateAgentsForCompany(req: Request, companyId: string) {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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if (req.actor.type === "board") {
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if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) return null;
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const allowed = await access.canUser(companyId, req.actor.userId, "agents:create");
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if (!allowed) {
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throw forbidden("Missing permission: agents:create");
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}
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return null;
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "agents:create",
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resource: { type: "company", companyId },
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});
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if (!decision.allowed) {
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throw forbidden(decision.explanation);
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}
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if (!req.actor.agentId) throw forbidden("Agent authentication required");
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const actorAgent = await svc.getById(req.actor.agentId);
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if (req.actor.type !== "agent") return null;
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const actorAgent = req.actor.agentId ? await svc.getById(req.actor.agentId) : null;
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if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) {
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throw forbidden("Agent key cannot access another company");
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}
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const allowedByGrant = await access.hasPermission(companyId, "agent", actorAgent.id, "agents:create");
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if (!allowedByGrant && !canCreateAgents(actorAgent)) {
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throw forbidden("Missing permission: can create agents");
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}
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return actorAgent;
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}
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async function assertBoardCanManageAgentsForCompany(req: Request, companyId: string) {
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assertBoard(req);
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) return;
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const allowed = await access.canUser(companyId, req.actor.userId, "agents:create");
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if (!allowed) {
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throw forbidden("Missing permission: agents:create");
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}
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "agents:create",
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resource: { type: "company", companyId },
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});
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if (decision.allowed) return;
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throw forbidden(decision.explanation);
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}
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async function assertCanReadConfigurations(req: Request, companyId: string) {
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@@ -592,15 +599,12 @@ export function agentRoutes(
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async function actorCanReadConfigurationsForCompany(req: Request, companyId: string) {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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if (req.actor.type === "board") {
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if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) return true;
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return access.canUser(companyId, req.actor.userId, "agents:create");
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}
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if (!req.actor.agentId) return false;
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const actorAgent = await svc.getById(req.actor.agentId);
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if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) return false;
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const allowedByGrant = await access.hasPermission(companyId, "agent", actorAgent.id, "agents:create");
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return allowedByGrant || canCreateAgents(actorAgent);
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "agent_config:read",
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resource: { type: "company", companyId },
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});
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return decision.allowed;
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}
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async function buildSkippedWakeupResponse(
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@@ -672,27 +676,13 @@ export function agentRoutes(
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async function assertCanUpdateAgent(req: Request, targetAgent: { id: string; companyId: string }) {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, targetAgent.companyId);
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if (req.actor.type === "board") {
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await assertBoardCanManageAgentsForCompany(req, targetAgent.companyId);
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return;
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}
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if (!req.actor.agentId) throw forbidden("Agent authentication required");
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const actorAgent = await svc.getById(req.actor.agentId);
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if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== targetAgent.companyId) {
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throw forbidden("Agent key cannot access another company");
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}
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if (actorAgent.id === targetAgent.id) return;
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if (actorAgent.role === "ceo") return;
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const allowedByGrant = await access.hasPermission(
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targetAgent.companyId,
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"agent",
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actorAgent.id,
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"agents:create",
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);
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if (allowedByGrant || canCreateAgents(actorAgent)) return;
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throw forbidden("Only CEO or agent creators can modify other agents");
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "agent_config:update",
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resource: { type: "agent", companyId: targetAgent.companyId, agentId: targetAgent.id },
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});
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if (decision.allowed) return;
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throw forbidden(decision.explanation);
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}
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async function assertCanReadAgent(req: Request, targetAgent: { companyId: string }) {
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