Add low-trust review containment (#7530)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract.
> - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal
same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and
generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads.
> - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context,
which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer
assigned to hostile content.
> - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging,
route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output
does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the
low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations.
> - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection,
preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind
promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion,
documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks,
enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor
authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic.
> - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review
containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot
surfaces.

Fixes #7531.

## What Changed

- Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus
database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work
products.
- Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent
self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion
checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context.
- Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source
trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime
containment, and quarantine redaction.
- Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust
preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views.
- Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated
`doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review
contract plan under `doc/plans/`.
- Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered
migration are not broken by the renumbered migration.

## Verification

- Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with
lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`.
- Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows` changes.
- Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment
tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata.
- Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to
`0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT
EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not
broken.
- `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts
ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps`
- `git diff --check`
- GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release
registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify,
policy/review, Socket, and Snyk.
- Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved
Greptile review threads.
- No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly
says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server
authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata,
and UI preset controls.
- Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate
future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions.
- Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover
the current known routes but future integrations must route through the
same containment layer.
- The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is
5/5.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI
workflow.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added
per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically
required
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import express from "express";
 import request from "supertest";
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { DEFAULT_OPENCODE_LOCAL_MODEL } from "@paperclipai/adapter-opencode-local";
+import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET } from "@paperclipai/shared";
 
 vi.mock("acpx/runtime", () => ({
   createAcpRuntime: vi.fn(),
@@ -396,6 +397,11 @@ describe.sequential("agent permission routes", () => {
 
   it("redacts agent detail for authenticated company members without agent admin permission", async () => {
     mockAccessService.canUser.mockResolvedValue(false);
+    mockAccessService.decide.mockImplementation(async (input: { action?: string }) => ({
+      allowed: input.action === "agent:read",
+      reason: input.action === "agent:read" ? "allow_test_read" : "deny_missing_grant",
+      explanation: input.action === "agent:read" ? "Allowed by test read grant." : "Missing test grant.",
+    }));
 
     const app = await createApp({
       type: "board",
@@ -412,8 +418,54 @@ describe.sequential("agent permission routes", () => {
     expect(res.body.runtimeConfig).toEqual({});
   }, 20_000);
 
+  it("keeps board agent detail unredacted for low-trust agents", async () => {
+    mockAgentService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
+      ...baseAgent,
+      permissions: {
+        ...baseAgent.permissions,
+        trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
+      },
+      adapterConfig: {
+        command: "pnpm agent:run",
+        env: { PAPERCLIP_API_KEY: "secret-test-key" },
+      },
+      runtimeConfig: {
+        modelProfiles: {
+          default: { enabled: true, adapterConfig: { model: "openai/gpt-5.4-mini" } },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    const app = await createApp({
+      type: "board",
+      userId: "board-user",
+      source: "local_implicit",
+      isInstanceAdmin: true,
+      companyIds: [companyId],
+    });
+
+    const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) => request(baseUrl).get(`/api/agents/${agentId}`));
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.adapterConfig).toMatchObject({
+      command: "pnpm agent:run",
+      env: { PAPERCLIP_API_KEY: "secret-test-key" },
+    });
+    expect(res.body.runtimeConfig).toMatchObject({
+      modelProfiles: {
+        default: { enabled: true, adapterConfig: { model: "openai/gpt-5.4-mini" } },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.body.permissions).toMatchObject({ trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET });
+  }, 20_000);
+
   it("redacts company agent list for authenticated company members without agent admin permission", async () => {
     mockAccessService.canUser.mockResolvedValue(false);
+    mockAccessService.decide.mockImplementation(async (input: { action?: string }) => ({
+      allowed: input.action === "agent:read",
+      reason: input.action === "agent:read" ? "allow_test_read" : "deny_missing_grant",
+      explanation: input.action === "agent:read" ? "Allowed by test read grant." : "Missing test grant.",
+    }));
 
     const app = await createApp({
       type: "board",