Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
Dotta
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import {
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companyMemberships,
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createDb,
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instanceUserRoles,
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issues,
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principalPermissionGrants,
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projects,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import {
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getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport,
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startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase,
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@@ -61,6 +63,33 @@ async function createProject(db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>, companyId: string,
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.then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function createIssue(
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db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>,
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companyId: string,
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input: {
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id?: string;
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title?: string;
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projectId?: string | null;
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parentId?: string | null;
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assigneeAgentId?: string | null;
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} = {},
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) {
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return db
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.insert(issues)
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.values({
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id: input.id ?? randomUUID(),
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companyId,
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title: input.title ?? `Issue ${randomUUID()}`,
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status: "todo",
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priority: "medium",
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projectId: input.projectId ?? null,
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parentId: input.parentId ?? null,
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assigneeAgentId: input.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
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})
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.returning()
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.then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function grantAgentPermission(
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db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>,
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companyId: string,
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@@ -98,6 +127,7 @@ describeEmbeddedPostgres("authorization service", () => {
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await db.delete(principalPermissionGrants);
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await db.delete(companyMemberships);
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await db.delete(instanceUserRoles);
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await db.delete(issues);
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await db.delete(agents);
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await db.delete(projects);
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await db.delete(companies);
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@@ -218,6 +248,141 @@ describeEmbeddedPostgres("authorization service", () => {
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expect(decision.explanation).toContain("simple mode");
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});
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it("limits low-trust issue reads to the configured project and root issue boundary", async () => {
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const company = await createCompany(db, "LowTrustIssueReads");
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const project = await createProject(db, company.id, "Allowed");
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const otherProject = await createProject(db, company.id, "Denied");
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const rootIssueId = randomUUID();
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const actorAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id, {
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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projectIds: [project.id],
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rootIssueId,
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},
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},
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},
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});
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const rootIssue = await createIssue(db, company.id, {
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id: rootIssueId,
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projectId: project.id,
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assigneeAgentId: actorAgent.id,
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});
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const childIssue = await createIssue(db, company.id, {
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projectId: project.id,
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parentId: rootIssue.id,
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});
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const unrelatedIssue = await createIssue(db, company.id, {
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projectId: otherProject.id,
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});
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const authorization = authorizationService(db);
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const actor = { type: "agent" as const, agentId: actorAgent.id, companyId: company.id, source: "agent_key" as const };
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const rootDecision = await authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "issue:read",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId: company.id,
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issueId: rootIssue.id,
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projectId: rootIssue.projectId,
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parentIssueId: rootIssue.parentId,
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assigneeAgentId: rootIssue.assigneeAgentId,
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status: rootIssue.status,
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},
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});
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const childDecision = await authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "issue:read",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId: company.id,
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issueId: childIssue.id,
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projectId: childIssue.projectId,
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parentIssueId: childIssue.parentId,
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status: childIssue.status,
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},
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});
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const unrelatedDecision = await authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "issue:read",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId: company.id,
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issueId: unrelatedIssue.id,
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projectId: unrelatedIssue.projectId,
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parentIssueId: unrelatedIssue.parentId,
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status: unrelatedIssue.status,
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},
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});
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expect(rootDecision).toMatchObject({ allowed: true, reason: "allow_low_trust_boundary" });
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expect(childDecision).toMatchObject({ allowed: true, reason: "allow_low_trust_boundary" });
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expect(unrelatedDecision).toMatchObject({ allowed: false, reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary" });
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});
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it("blocks low-trust project, agent, company-wide, and outside-boundary assignment access", async () => {
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const company = await createCompany(db, "LowTrustOtherResources");
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const project = await createProject(db, company.id, "Allowed");
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const otherProject = await createProject(db, company.id, "Denied");
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const collaborator = await createAgent(db, company.id);
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const higherTrustAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id, { role: "cto" });
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const actorAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id, {
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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projectIds: [project.id],
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allowedAgentIds: [collaborator.id],
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},
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},
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},
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});
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const authorization = authorizationService(db);
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const actor = { type: "agent" as const, agentId: actorAgent.id, companyId: company.id, source: "agent_key" as const };
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "project:read",
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resource: { type: "project", companyId: company.id, projectId: project.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: true, reason: "allow_low_trust_boundary" });
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "project:read",
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resource: { type: "project", companyId: company.id, projectId: otherProject.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: false, reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary" });
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "agent:read",
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resource: { type: "agent", companyId: company.id, agentId: collaborator.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: true, reason: "allow_low_trust_boundary" });
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "agent:read",
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resource: { type: "agent", companyId: company.id, agentId: higherTrustAgent.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: false, reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary" });
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "company_scope:read",
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resource: { type: "company", companyId: company.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: false, reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary" });
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await expect(authorization.decide({
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actor,
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action: "tasks:assign",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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assigneeAgentId: higherTrustAgent.id,
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},
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scope: { projectId: project.id, assigneeAgentId: higherTrustAgent.id },
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})).resolves.toMatchObject({ allowed: false, reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary" });
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});
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it("denies simple-mode assignment when the target agent requires protected-assignment approval", async () => {
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const company = await createCompany(db, "ProtectedAssignment");
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const actorAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id, { role: "engineer" });
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