Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
Dotta
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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agents,
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companies,
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createDb,
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executionWorkspaces,
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heartbeatRuns,
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issues,
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projectWorkspaces,
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projects,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import {
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getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport,
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startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase,
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@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@ describeEmbeddedPostgres("workspace runtime service authz helper", () => {
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await db.delete(executionWorkspaces);
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await db.delete(projectWorkspaces);
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await db.delete(projects);
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await db.delete(heartbeatRuns);
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await db.delete(agents);
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await db.delete(companies);
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});
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@@ -149,6 +153,144 @@ describeEmbeddedPostgres("workspace runtime service authz helper", () => {
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})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
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});
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it("rejects low-trust CEO runtime service mutations unless runtime.manage is granted", async () => {
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const companyId = await seedCompany();
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const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
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const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
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await db
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.update(agents)
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.set({
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId,
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projectIds: [projectId],
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},
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},
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},
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})
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.where(eq(agents.id, ceoAgentId));
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await db.insert(issues).values({
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id: randomUUID(),
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companyId,
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projectId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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title: "Low-trust workspace",
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status: "todo",
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priority: "medium",
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assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
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});
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await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
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actor: {
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type: "agent",
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agentId: ceoAgentId,
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companyId,
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source: "agent_key",
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},
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} as any, {
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companyId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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})).rejects.toMatchObject({
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status: 403,
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message: "Low-trust runs cannot manage workspace runtime services unless the boundary grants runtime.manage",
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});
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});
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it("allows standard CEO runtime service mutations for low-trust workspace issues", async () => {
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const companyId = await seedCompany();
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const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
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const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
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await db.insert(issues).values({
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id: randomUUID(),
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companyId,
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projectId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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title: "Issue-scoped low-trust workspace",
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status: "todo",
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priority: "medium",
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assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
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executionPolicy: {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId,
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projectIds: [projectId],
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},
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},
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},
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});
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await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
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actor: {
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type: "agent",
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agentId: ceoAgentId,
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companyId,
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source: "agent_key",
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},
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} as any, {
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companyId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
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});
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it("rejects runtime service mutations when only the run policy is low-trust without runtime.manage", async () => {
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const companyId = await seedCompany();
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const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
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const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
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const issueId = randomUUID();
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const runId = randomUUID();
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await db.insert(issues).values({
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id: issueId,
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companyId,
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projectId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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title: "Run-scoped low-trust workspace",
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status: "in_progress",
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priority: "medium",
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assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
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});
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await db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
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id: runId,
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companyId,
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agentId: ceoAgentId,
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status: "running",
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contextSnapshot: {
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issueId,
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executionPolicy: {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId,
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projectIds: [projectId],
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},
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},
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},
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},
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});
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await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
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actor: {
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type: "agent",
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agentId: ceoAgentId,
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companyId,
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runId,
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source: "agent_key",
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},
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} as any, {
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companyId,
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projectWorkspaceId,
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})).rejects.toMatchObject({
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status: 403,
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message: "Low-trust runs cannot manage workspace runtime services unless the boundary grants runtime.manage",
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});
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});
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it("allows agents with a non-terminal assigned issue in the target project workspace", async () => {
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const companyId = await seedCompany();
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const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
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