Add low-trust review containment (#7530)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract.
> - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal
same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and
generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads.
> - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context,
which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer
assigned to hostile content.
> - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging,
route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output
does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the
low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations.
> - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection,
preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind
promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion,
documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks,
enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor
authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic.
> - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review
containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot
surfaces.

Fixes #7531.

## What Changed

- Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus
database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work
products.
- Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent
self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion
checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context.
- Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source
trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime
containment, and quarantine redaction.
- Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust
preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views.
- Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated
`doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review
contract plan under `doc/plans/`.
- Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered
migration are not broken by the renumbered migration.

## Verification

- Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with
lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`.
- Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows` changes.
- Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment
tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata.
- Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to
`0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT
EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not
broken.
- `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts
ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps`
- `git diff --check`
- GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release
registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify,
policy/review, Socket, and Snyk.
- Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved
Greptile review threads.
- No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly
says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server
authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata,
and UI preset controls.
- Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate
future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions.
- Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover
the current known routes but future integrations must route through the
same containment layer.
- The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is
5/5.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI
workflow.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added
per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically
required
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

server/src/services/issues.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ import type {
   IssueProductivityReview,
   IssueProductivityReviewTrigger,
   IssueRelationIssueSummary,
+  LowTrustBoundary,
   SuccessfulRunHandoffState,
 } from "@paperclipai/shared";
 import {
@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ export interface IssueFilters {
   includeBlockedBy?: boolean;
   includeBlockedInboxAttention?: boolean;
   hasPlanDocument?: boolean;
+  lowTrustBoundary?: LowTrustBoundary & { companyId: string };
   q?: string;
   limit?: number;
   offset?: number;
@@ -1181,6 +1183,39 @@ const PRODUCTIVITY_REVIEW_TRIGGERS: readonly IssueProductivityReviewTrigger[] =
   "long_active_duration",
   "high_churn",
 ];
+
+function lowTrustBoundaryIssueCondition(
+  companyId: string,
+  boundary: (LowTrustBoundary & { companyId: string }) | null | undefined,
+) {
+  if (!boundary || boundary.companyId !== companyId) return null;
+  const clauses: SQL[] = [];
+  const issueIds = [...new Set(boundary.issueIds ?? [])];
+  const projectIds = [...new Set(boundary.projectIds ?? [])];
+  if (issueIds.length > 0) clauses.push(inArray(issues.id, issueIds));
+  if (projectIds.length > 0) clauses.push(inArray(issues.projectId, projectIds));
+  if (boundary.rootIssueId) {
+    clauses.push(sql<boolean>`
+      ${issues.id} IN (
+        WITH RECURSIVE descendants(id) AS (
+          SELECT ${issues.id}
+          FROM ${issues}
+          WHERE ${issues.companyId} = ${companyId}
+            AND ${issues.id} = ${boundary.rootIssueId}
+          UNION
+          SELECT ${issues.id}
+          FROM ${issues}
+          JOIN descendants ON ${issues.parentId} = descendants.id
+          WHERE ${issues.companyId} = ${companyId}
+        )
+        SELECT id FROM descendants
+      )
+    `);
+  }
+  if (clauses.length === 0) return sql<boolean>`false`;
+  return or(...clauses);
+}
+
 const BLOCKER_ATTENTION_OPEN_RECOVERY_TERMINAL_STATUSES = ["done", "cancelled"];
 const BLOCKER_ATTENTION_MAX_DEPTH = 8;
 const BLOCKER_ATTENTION_MAX_NODES = 2000;
@@ -1934,6 +1969,7 @@ const issueListSelect = {
   executionWorkspaceId: issues.executionWorkspaceId,
   executionWorkspacePreference: issues.executionWorkspacePreference,
   executionWorkspaceSettings: sql<null>`null`,
+  sourceTrust: issues.sourceTrust,
   startedAt: issues.startedAt,
   completedAt: issues.completedAt,
   cancelledAt: issues.cancelledAt,
@@ -2873,6 +2909,8 @@ async function blockedInboxIssueConditions(
       )
     `);
   }
+  const lowTrustCondition = lowTrustBoundaryIssueCondition(companyId, filters?.lowTrustBoundary);
+  if (lowTrustCondition) conditions.push(lowTrustCondition);
   if (filters?.status) {
     const statuses = filters.status.split(",").map((status) => status.trim()).filter(Boolean);
     if (statuses.length > 0) {
@@ -3840,6 +3878,8 @@ export function issueService(db: Db) {
           )
         `);
       }
+      const lowTrustCondition = lowTrustBoundaryIssueCondition(companyId, filters?.lowTrustBoundary);
+      if (lowTrustCondition) conditions.push(lowTrustCondition);
       if (filters?.status) {
         const statuses = filters.status.split(",").map((s) => s.trim());
         conditions.push(statuses.length === 1 ? eq(issues.status, statuses[0]) : inArray(issues.status, statuses));
@@ -5805,6 +5845,7 @@ export function issueService(db: Db) {
         authorType?: IssueCommentAuthorType | null;
         presentation?: IssueCommentPresentation | null;
         metadata?: IssueCommentMetadata | null;
+        sourceTrust?: typeof issueComments.$inferInsert.sourceTrust;
         createdAt?: Date | string | null;
       },
     ) => {
@@ -5839,6 +5880,7 @@ export function issueService(db: Db) {
           body: redactedBody,
           presentation,
           metadata,
+          sourceTrust: options?.sourceTrust ?? null,
           ...(createdAt && !Number.isNaN(createdAt.getTime()) ? { createdAt } : {}),
         })
         .returning();