Files
paperclip/server/src/agent-auth-jwt.ts
T
Jannes Stubbemann 70357b961f feat(security): per-company JWT signing keys for multi-tenant isolation (#5864)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - Agents authenticate to the server with a JWT signed by the
deployment's master secret
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, all agents from every tenant are
signed with the *same* key, so a leak (CI/staging dump, hostile
contractor with infra access, supply-chain) lets the attacker mint
tokens for *any* tenant
> - The same master secret also issued tokens with a 48-hour TTL, giving
any leaked token a two-day window of validity even after rotation
> - This pull request derives a per-company signing key via
`HMAC-SHA256(master, "jwt:<companyId>")` and reduces the default TTL to
1h; the verifier tries the per-company key first and falls back to the
master secret only for tokens issued before this change so no agent gets
locked out on deploy
> - The benefit is multi-tenant key isolation (a leak of one company's
derived key cannot forge tokens for another) and a tighter blast-radius
on any leaked token, with zero local-first impact (single-tenant deploys
derive their one company's key the same way and continue to work
unchanged)

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #5288 — a separate key-hygiene finding in the same module
(`agent-auth-jwt.ts` falls back to `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` as the JWT
signing secret). Related agent-JWT trust-model concern, but not fixed by
this PR — the master-secret fallback selection is unchanged here.

No existing issue covers this PR's problem directly — described in-PR:

- In a multi-tenant deployment, agents from every tenant get JWTs signed
with the *same* master key, so a single leak (CI/staging dump, hostile
contractor, supply chain) lets the attacker mint tokens for *any*
tenant.
- The same master secret issued tokens with a 48-hour TTL, giving any
leaked token a two-day validity window even after rotation.
- Fix: derive a per-company signing key via `HMAC-SHA256(master,
"jwt:<companyId>")` and reduce the default TTL to 1h, with a
master-secret verification fallback so pre-existing tokens are not
locked out on deploy.

## What Changed

- **`server/src/agent-auth-jwt.ts`**
- New `deriveCompanySigningKey(masterSecret, companyId)` — `HMAC-SHA256`
with domain-separated input (`jwt:<companyId>`) so the master secret can
be safely reused for other HMAC purposes in the future without
cross-protocol risk.
  - `signAgentJwt` always signs with the derived per-company key.
- `verifyAgentJwt` reads `company_id` from the token's (untrusted) claim
payload, looks up the candidate derived key, and verifies. If that fails
AND a master secret is set, it falls back to verifying with the raw
master secret — pre-existing tokens validate until they expire.
Verification still fails if the signature doesn't bind.
- Default TTL: `60 * 60 * 48` → `60 * 60`. Existing
`PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS` override still wins.
- **`PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_DISABLE_LEGACY_FALLBACK`** (optional, default
off) — operators set this ~one TTL after deploying to sunset the
master-secret verification fallback entirely, closing the window in
which a leaked master secret could forge arbitrary-`exp` tokens for any
tenant.
- **`server/src/__tests__/agent-auth-jwt.test.ts`** (6 new cases)
- Per-company isolation via tamper: token for company A fails when
verified for company B.
- Legacy-token verification path: tokens signed with the raw master
secret still verify.
  - Default TTL is 1h.
- Legacy fallback toggle: master-secret tokens accepted when unset,
rejected when enabled, and per-company tokens unaffected either way.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck` — clean.
- `npx vitest run agent-auth-jwt` — 11/11 pass (6 new + 5 existing).
- Manual: token signed for company A under per-company key fails when
verified against company B's derived key.

## Risks

- **Backward-compatible verification**, so no agent gets locked out on
deploy — but operators relying on hot-swapping the master secret should
note that pre-existing tokens *will* keep validating against the master
key until their TTL elapses, unless
`PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_DISABLE_LEGACY_FALLBACK=true` is set to end the
fallback window explicitly.
- **TTL reduction is a default, not a hard cap.** Operators who relied
on the 48h window can override via env. If 1h is too aggressive for
upstream taste, happy to gate the change behind an env var.
- **No new required env vars.** Single-tenant local-first deploys derive
one company's key the same way and behave identically to today.
- **Domain-separated HMAC input** (`jwt:<companyId>`) means the master
secret can be safely reused for other future HMAC purposes without
cross-protocol risk.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; rebase +
legacy-fallback sunset documentation by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).

## Checklist

- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass (`agent-auth-jwt` 11/11)
- [x] Added per-company-isolation, legacy-fallback, and TTL-default
tests
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #3967
(cross-tenant 404 oracle) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 18:00:22 -07:00

188 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
interface JwtHeader {
alg: string;
typ?: string;
}
export interface LocalAgentJwtClaims {
sub: string;
company_id: string;
adapter_type: string;
run_id: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
iss?: string;
aud?: string;
jti?: string;
}
const JWT_ALGORITHM = "HS256";
function parseNumber(value: string | undefined, fallback: number) {
const parsed = Number(value);
if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) return fallback;
return Math.floor(parsed);
}
function parseBooleanEnv(value: string | undefined): boolean {
if (!value) return false;
const normalized = value.trim().toLowerCase();
return normalized === "1" || normalized === "true" || normalized === "yes" || normalized === "on";
}
function jwtConfig() {
const secret = process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET?.trim() || process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET?.trim();
if (!secret) return null;
return {
secret,
ttlSeconds: parseNumber(process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS, 60 * 60),
issuer: process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_ISSUER ?? "paperclip",
audience: process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_AUDIENCE ?? "paperclip-api",
disableLegacyFallback: parseBooleanEnv(process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_DISABLE_LEGACY_FALLBACK),
};
}
/**
* Derive a per-company signing key from the master JWT secret and a companyId.
*
* In a multi-tenant deployment this ensures that a JWT signed for company A
* cannot be reused to authenticate as an agent in company B, even if the raw
* token leaks. The instance-wide master secret is never used to sign new
* tokens — it is retained only as a verification fallback so that tokens
* issued before this change continue to validate.
*
* The derivation domain-separates with the `jwt:` prefix so the same master
* secret can safely be reused for other HMAC purposes without key reuse.
*/
function deriveCompanySigningKey(masterSecret: string, companyId: string): string {
return createHmac("sha256", masterSecret).update(`jwt:${companyId}`).digest("hex");
}
function base64UrlEncode(value: string) {
return Buffer.from(value, "utf8").toString("base64url");
}
function base64UrlDecode(value: string) {
return Buffer.from(value, "base64url").toString("utf8");
}
function signPayload(secret: string, signingInput: string) {
return createHmac("sha256", secret).update(signingInput).digest("base64url");
}
function parseJson(value: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(value);
return parsed && typeof parsed === "object" ? parsed as Record<string, unknown> : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function safeCompare(a: string, b: string) {
const left = Buffer.from(a);
const right = Buffer.from(b);
if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
return timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
export function createLocalAgentJwt(agentId: string, companyId: string, adapterType: string, runId: string) {
const config = jwtConfig();
if (!config) return null;
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const claims: LocalAgentJwtClaims = {
sub: agentId,
company_id: companyId,
adapter_type: adapterType,
run_id: runId,
iat: now,
exp: now + config.ttlSeconds,
iss: config.issuer,
aud: config.audience,
};
const header = {
alg: JWT_ALGORITHM,
typ: "JWT",
};
const signingInput = `${base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(header))}.${base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(claims))}`;
// Sign with the per-company derived key so a leaked token cannot be reused
// across tenants.
const signingKey = deriveCompanySigningKey(config.secret, companyId);
const signature = signPayload(signingKey, signingInput);
return `${signingInput}.${signature}`;
}
export function verifyLocalAgentJwt(token: string): LocalAgentJwtClaims | null {
if (!token) return null;
const config = jwtConfig();
if (!config) return null;
const parts = token.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3) return null;
const [headerB64, claimsB64, signature] = parts;
const header = parseJson(base64UrlDecode(headerB64));
if (!header || header.alg !== JWT_ALGORITHM) return null;
const claims = parseJson(base64UrlDecode(claimsB64));
if (!claims) return null;
const claimedCompanyId = typeof claims.company_id === "string" ? claims.company_id : null;
if (!claimedCompanyId) return null;
const signingInput = `${headerB64}.${claimsB64}`;
// Try the per-company derived key first (current tokens). Fall back to the
// raw master secret so tokens issued before per-company derivation existed
// continue to verify — this preserves backward compatibility for any
// outstanding tokens (TTL bounds the legacy window naturally).
//
// Operators should set `PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_DISABLE_LEGACY_FALLBACK=true`
// approximately one JWT TTL (~1h by default, see PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS)
// after deploying per-company signing. Once set, the master-secret fallback
// is disabled and only tokens validating under the per-company derived key
// are accepted — closing the window in which a leaked master secret could
// be used to forge tokens with arbitrary future `exp` values for any tenant.
const perCompanyKey = deriveCompanySigningKey(config.secret, claimedCompanyId);
const perCompanySig = signPayload(perCompanyKey, signingInput);
let signatureOk = safeCompare(signature, perCompanySig);
if (!signatureOk && !config.disableLegacyFallback) {
const legacySig = signPayload(config.secret, signingInput);
signatureOk = safeCompare(signature, legacySig);
}
if (!signatureOk) return null;
const sub = typeof claims.sub === "string" ? claims.sub : null;
const adapterType = typeof claims.adapter_type === "string" ? claims.adapter_type : null;
const runId = typeof claims.run_id === "string" ? claims.run_id : null;
const iat = typeof claims.iat === "number" ? claims.iat : null;
const exp = typeof claims.exp === "number" ? claims.exp : null;
if (!sub || !adapterType || !runId || !iat || !exp) return null;
const companyId = claimedCompanyId;
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (exp < now) return null;
const issuer = typeof claims.iss === "string" ? claims.iss : undefined;
const audience = typeof claims.aud === "string" ? claims.aud : undefined;
if (issuer && issuer !== config.issuer) return null;
if (audience && audience !== config.audience) return null;
return {
sub,
company_id: companyId,
adapter_type: adapterType,
run_id: runId,
iat,
exp,
...(issuer ? { iss: issuer } : {}),
...(audience ? { aud: audience } : {}),
jti: typeof claims.jti === "string" ? claims.jti : undefined,
};
}