Files
paperclip/server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
T
Dotta dbebf30c89 Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract.
> - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal
same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and
generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads.
> - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context,
which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer
assigned to hostile content.
> - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging,
route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output
does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the
low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations.
> - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection,
preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind
promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion,
documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks,
enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor
authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic.
> - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review
containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot
surfaces.

Fixes #7531.

## What Changed

- Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus
database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work
products.
- Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent
self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion
checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context.
- Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source
trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime
containment, and quarantine redaction.
- Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust
preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views.
- Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated
`doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review
contract plan under `doc/plans/`.
- Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered
migration are not broken by the renumbered migration.

## Verification

- Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with
lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`.
- Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows` changes.
- Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment
tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata.
- Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to
`0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT
EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not
broken.
- `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts
ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps`
- `git diff --check`
- GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release
registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify,
policy/review, Socket, and Snyk.
- Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved
Greptile review threads.
- No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly
says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server
authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata,
and UI preset controls.
- Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate
future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions.
- Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover
the current known routes but future integrations must route through the
same containment layer.
- The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is
5/5.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI
workflow.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added
per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically
required
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-05 16:48:02 -05:00

422 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
agents,
companies,
createDb,
executionWorkspaces,
heartbeatRuns,
issues,
projectWorkspaces,
projects,
} from "@paperclipai/db";
import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET } from "@paperclipai/shared";
import {
getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport,
startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase,
} from "./helpers/embedded-postgres.js";
import {
assertCanManageExecutionWorkspaceRuntimeServices,
assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices,
} from "../routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.js";
const embeddedPostgresSupport = await getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport();
const describeEmbeddedPostgres = embeddedPostgresSupport.supported ? describe : describe.skip;
if (!embeddedPostgresSupport.supported) {
console.warn(
`Skipping embedded Postgres workspace runtime auth tests on this host: ${embeddedPostgresSupport.reason ?? "unsupported environment"}`,
);
}
describeEmbeddedPostgres("workspace runtime service authz helper", () => {
let db!: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
let tempDb: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase>> | null = null;
beforeAll(async () => {
tempDb = await startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase("paperclip-workspace-runtime-authz-");
db = createDb(tempDb.connectionString);
}, 20_000);
afterEach(async () => {
await db.delete(issues);
await db.delete(executionWorkspaces);
await db.delete(projectWorkspaces);
await db.delete(projects);
await db.delete(heartbeatRuns);
await db.delete(agents);
await db.delete(companies);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await tempDb?.cleanup();
});
async function seedCompany() {
const companyId = randomUUID();
await db.insert(companies).values({
id: companyId,
name: "Paperclip",
issuePrefix: `PAP-${companyId.slice(0, 8)}`,
requireBoardApprovalForNewAgents: false,
});
return companyId;
}
async function seedProjectWorkspace(companyId: string) {
const projectId = randomUUID();
const projectWorkspaceId = randomUUID();
await db.insert(projects).values({
id: projectId,
companyId,
name: "Workspace authz",
status: "in_progress",
});
await db.insert(projectWorkspaces).values({
id: projectWorkspaceId,
companyId,
projectId,
name: "Primary",
sourceType: "local_path",
cwd: "/tmp/paperclip-authz-project",
isPrimary: true,
});
return { projectId, projectWorkspaceId };
}
async function seedExecutionWorkspace(companyId: string, projectId: string, projectWorkspaceId: string) {
const executionWorkspaceId = randomUUID();
await db.insert(executionWorkspaces).values({
id: executionWorkspaceId,
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
mode: "isolated_workspace",
strategyType: "git_worktree",
name: "Execution workspace",
status: "active",
providerType: "local_fs",
cwd: "/tmp/paperclip-authz-execution",
});
return executionWorkspaceId;
}
async function seedAgent(
companyId: string,
input: { role?: string; reportsTo?: string | null; name?: string } = {},
) {
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db.insert(agents).values({
id: agentId,
companyId,
name: input.name ?? "Agent",
role: input.role ?? "engineer",
reportsTo: input.reportsTo ?? null,
});
return agentId;
}
it("allows board actors to manage project workspace runtime services", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "board-1",
companyIds: [companyId],
source: "session",
isInstanceAdmin: false,
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("allows CEO agents to manage any project workspace runtime services in their company", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: ceoAgentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("rejects low-trust CEO runtime service mutations unless runtime.manage is granted", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
await db
.update(agents)
.set({
permissions: {
trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
authorizationPolicy: {
trustBoundary: {
mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
companyId,
projectIds: [projectId],
},
},
},
})
.where(eq(agents.id, ceoAgentId));
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
title: "Low-trust workspace",
status: "todo",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
});
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: ceoAgentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 403,
message: "Low-trust runs cannot manage workspace runtime services unless the boundary grants runtime.manage",
});
});
it("allows standard CEO runtime service mutations for low-trust workspace issues", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
title: "Issue-scoped low-trust workspace",
status: "todo",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
executionPolicy: {
authorizationPolicy: {
trustBoundary: {
mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
companyId,
projectIds: [projectId],
},
},
},
});
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: ceoAgentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("rejects runtime service mutations when only the run policy is low-trust without runtime.manage", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const ceoAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "ceo", name: "CEO" });
const issueId = randomUUID();
const runId = randomUUID();
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: issueId,
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
title: "Run-scoped low-trust workspace",
status: "in_progress",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: ceoAgentId,
});
await db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
id: runId,
companyId,
agentId: ceoAgentId,
status: "running",
contextSnapshot: {
issueId,
executionPolicy: {
authorizationPolicy: {
trustBoundary: {
mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
companyId,
projectIds: [projectId],
},
},
},
},
});
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: ceoAgentId,
companyId,
runId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 403,
message: "Low-trust runs cannot manage workspace runtime services unless the boundary grants runtime.manage",
});
});
it("allows agents with a non-terminal assigned issue in the target project workspace", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const agentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { name: "Engineer" });
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
title: "Use this workspace",
status: "todo",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: agentId,
});
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("allows managers to manage execution workspace runtime services for their reporting subtree", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const executionWorkspaceId = await seedExecutionWorkspace(companyId, projectId, projectWorkspaceId);
const managerId = await seedAgent(companyId, { role: "cto", name: "Manager" });
const reportId = await seedAgent(companyId, { reportsTo: managerId, name: "Report" });
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
executionWorkspaceId,
title: "Use execution workspace",
status: "in_progress",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: reportId,
});
await expect(assertCanManageExecutionWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: managerId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
executionWorkspaceId,
})).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("rejects unrelated same-company agents without matching workspace assignments", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const executionWorkspaceId = await seedExecutionWorkspace(companyId, projectId, projectWorkspaceId);
const assignedAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { name: "Assigned" });
const unrelatedAgentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { name: "Unrelated" });
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
executionWorkspaceId,
title: "Assigned issue",
status: "todo",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: assignedAgentId,
});
await expect(assertCanManageExecutionWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: unrelatedAgentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
executionWorkspaceId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 403,
message: "Missing permission to manage workspace runtime services",
});
});
it("rejects completed workspace assignments so stale issues do not keep access alive", async () => {
const companyId = await seedCompany();
const { projectId, projectWorkspaceId } = await seedProjectWorkspace(companyId);
const agentId = await seedAgent(companyId, { name: "Engineer" });
await db.insert(issues).values({
id: randomUUID(),
companyId,
projectId,
projectWorkspaceId,
title: "Completed issue",
status: "done",
priority: "medium",
assigneeAgentId: agentId,
});
await expect(assertCanManageProjectWorkspaceRuntimeServices(db, {
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId,
companyId,
source: "agent_key",
},
} as any, {
companyId,
projectWorkspaceId,
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 403,
message: "Missing permission to manage workspace runtime services",
});
});
});