dbebf30c89
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
145 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
145 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { Router } from "express";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { normalizeIssueIdentifier } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { validate } from "../middleware/validate.js";
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import { activityService, normalizeActivityLimit } from "../services/activity.js";
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import { assertAuthenticated, assertBoard, assertCompanyAccess } from "./authz.js";
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import { accessService, heartbeatService, issueService } from "../services/index.js";
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import { sanitizeRecord } from "../redaction.js";
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const createActivitySchema = z.object({
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actorType: z.enum(["agent", "user", "system", "plugin"]).optional().default("system"),
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actorId: z.string().min(1),
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action: z.string().min(1),
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entityType: z.string().min(1),
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entityId: z.string().min(1),
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agentId: z.string().uuid().optional().nullable(),
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details: z.record(z.unknown()).optional().nullable(),
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});
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export function activityRoutes(db: Db) {
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const router = Router();
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const svc = activityService(db);
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const access = accessService(db);
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const heartbeat = heartbeatService(db);
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const issueSvc = issueService(db);
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async function assertCompanyScopeReadAllowed(req: Parameters<typeof assertCompanyAccess>[0], res: any, companyId: string) {
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "company_scope:read",
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resource: { type: "company", companyId },
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});
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if (decision.allowed) return true;
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res.status(403).json({ error: "Activity is outside this actor's authorization boundary" });
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return false;
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}
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async function assertIssueReadAllowed(req: Parameters<typeof assertCompanyAccess>[0], res: any, issue: {
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id: string;
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companyId: string;
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projectId: string | null;
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parentId: string | null;
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assigneeAgentId: string | null;
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assigneeUserId: string | null;
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status: string;
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}) {
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "issue:read",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId: issue.companyId,
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issueId: issue.id,
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projectId: issue.projectId,
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parentIssueId: issue.parentId,
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assigneeAgentId: issue.assigneeAgentId,
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assigneeUserId: issue.assigneeUserId,
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status: issue.status,
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},
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});
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if (decision.allowed) return true;
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res.status(403).json({ error: "Issue activity is outside this actor's authorization boundary" });
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return false;
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}
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async function resolveIssueByRef(rawId: string) {
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const identifier = normalizeIssueIdentifier(rawId);
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if (identifier) {
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return issueSvc.getByIdentifier(identifier);
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}
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return issueSvc.getById(rawId);
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}
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router.get("/companies/:companyId/activity", async (req, res) => {
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const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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if (!(await assertCompanyScopeReadAllowed(req, res, companyId))) return;
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const filters = {
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companyId,
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agentId: req.query.agentId as string | undefined,
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entityType: req.query.entityType as string | undefined,
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entityId: req.query.entityId as string | undefined,
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limit: normalizeActivityLimit(Number(req.query.limit)),
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};
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const result = await svc.list(filters);
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res.json(result);
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});
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router.post("/companies/:companyId/activity", validate(createActivitySchema), async (req, res) => {
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assertBoard(req);
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const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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const event = await svc.create({
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companyId,
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...req.body,
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details: req.body.details ? sanitizeRecord(req.body.details) : null,
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});
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res.status(201).json(event);
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});
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router.get("/issues/:id/activity", async (req, res) => {
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const rawId = req.params.id as string;
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const issue = await resolveIssueByRef(rawId);
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if (!issue) {
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res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
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return;
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}
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assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId);
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if (!(await assertIssueReadAllowed(req, res, issue))) return;
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const result = await svc.forIssue(issue.id);
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res.json(result);
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});
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router.get("/issues/:id/runs", async (req, res) => {
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const rawId = req.params.id as string;
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const issue = await resolveIssueByRef(rawId);
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if (!issue) {
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res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
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return;
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}
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assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId);
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if (!(await assertIssueReadAllowed(req, res, issue))) return;
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const result = await svc.runsForIssue(issue.companyId, issue.id);
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res.json(result);
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});
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router.get("/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues", async (req, res) => {
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assertAuthenticated(req);
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const runId = req.params.runId as string;
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const run = await heartbeat.getRun(runId);
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if (!run) {
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res.json([]);
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return;
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}
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assertCompanyAccess(req, run.companyId);
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if (!(await assertCompanyScopeReadAllowed(req, res, run.companyId))) return;
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const result = await svc.issuesForRun(runId);
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res.json(result);
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});
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return router;
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}
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