Files
paperclip/server/src/services/low-trust-runtime-containment.ts
T
Dotta dbebf30c89 Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract.
> - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal
same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and
generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads.
> - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context,
which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer
assigned to hostile content.
> - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging,
route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output
does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the
low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations.
> - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection,
preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind
promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion,
documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks,
enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor
authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic.
> - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review
containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot
surfaces.

Fixes #7531.

## What Changed

- Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus
database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work
products.
- Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent
self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion
checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context.
- Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source
trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime
containment, and quarantine redaction.
- Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust
preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views.
- Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated
`doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review
contract plan under `doc/plans/`.
- Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered
migration are not broken by the renumbered migration.

## Verification

- Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with
lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`.
- Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows` changes.
- Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment
tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata.
- Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to
`0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT
EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not
broken.
- `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts
ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps`
- `git diff --check`
- GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release
registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify,
policy/review, Socket, and Snyk.
- Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved
Greptile review threads.
- No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly
says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server
authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata,
and UI preset controls.
- Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate
future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions.
- Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover
the current known routes but future integrations must route through the
same containment layer.
- The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is
5/5.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI
workflow.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added
per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically
required
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-05 16:48:02 -05:00

106 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { issues } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
import type { TrustPresetResolution } from "./trust-preset-resolver.js";
import {
LOW_TRUST_ISSUE_ANCESTRY_MAX_DEPTH,
isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary,
} from "./trust-preset-resolver.js";
export const LOW_TRUST_RUNTIME_MANAGEMENT_TOOL_CLASS = "runtime.manage";
export function isLowTrustRuntimeManagementAllowed(resolution: TrustPresetResolution) {
return resolution.kind === "low_trust_review" &&
(resolution.boundary.allowedToolClasses ?? []).includes(LOW_TRUST_RUNTIME_MANAGEMENT_TOOL_CLASS);
}
async function issueIdIsDescendantOf(db: Db, issueId: string, rootIssueId: string, companyId: string) {
let cursor: string | null = issueId;
// Keep the runtime preflight aligned with authorization while bounding DB work.
for (let depth = 0; cursor && depth < LOW_TRUST_ISSUE_ANCESTRY_MAX_DEPTH; depth += 1) {
if (cursor === rootIssueId) return true;
const row: { id: string; companyId: string; parentId: string | null } | null = await db
.select({ id: issues.id, companyId: issues.companyId, parentId: issues.parentId })
.from(issues)
.where(eq(issues.id, cursor))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!row || row.companyId !== companyId) return false;
cursor = row.parentId;
}
return false;
}
async function workspaceIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(input: {
db?: Db;
boundary: Extract<TrustPresetResolution, { kind: "low_trust_review" }>["boundary"];
issue: { companyId: string; id?: string | null; projectId?: string | null };
}) {
if (isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(input.boundary, input.issue)) return true;
if (!input.db || !input.issue.id || !input.boundary.rootIssueId) return false;
return issueIdIsDescendantOf(input.db, input.issue.id, input.boundary.rootIssueId, input.boundary.companyId);
}
export async function assertLowTrustWorkspaceIsolation(input: {
db?: Db;
resolution: TrustPresetResolution;
isolatedWorkspacesEnabled: boolean;
effectiveExecutionWorkspaceMode: string | null | undefined;
selectedEnvironmentDriver: string | null | undefined;
issue: { companyId: string; id?: string | null; projectId?: string | null } | null;
}) {
if (input.resolution.kind === "denied") {
throw unprocessable(input.resolution.detail, {
code: input.resolution.reason,
source: input.resolution.source,
});
}
if (input.resolution.kind !== "low_trust_review") return;
if (!input.isolatedWorkspacesEnabled) {
throw unprocessable("Low-trust execution requires isolated workspaces to be enabled.", {
code: "low_trust_isolation_unavailable",
});
}
if (input.effectiveExecutionWorkspaceMode !== "isolated_workspace") {
throw unprocessable("Low-trust execution requires an isolated execution workspace.", {
code: "low_trust_requires_isolated_workspace",
});
}
if (
!input.issue ||
!(await workspaceIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary({
db: input.db,
boundary: input.resolution.boundary,
issue: input.issue,
}))
) {
throw unprocessable("Low-trust execution issue is outside the active trust boundary.", {
code: "low_trust_boundary_mismatch",
});
}
if (input.selectedEnvironmentDriver !== "sandbox") {
throw unprocessable("Low-trust execution requires a sandbox environment driver.", {
code: "low_trust_requires_sandbox_environment",
});
}
}
export function assertLowTrustRuntimeServicesAllowed(input: {
resolution: TrustPresetResolution;
runtimeServiceCount: number;
}) {
if (input.resolution.kind === "denied") {
throw unprocessable(input.resolution.detail, {
code: input.resolution.reason,
source: input.resolution.source,
});
}
if (input.resolution.kind !== "low_trust_review") return;
if (input.runtimeServiceCount === 0) return;
if (isLowTrustRuntimeManagementAllowed(input.resolution)) return;
throw unprocessable("Low-trust execution cannot start runtime services unless the boundary grants runtime.manage.", {
code: "low_trust_runtime_services_denied",
});
}